The Cyprus Files released by Greece
The leadership of the Armed Forces in Greece, in 1974, has serious responsibilities for not reinforcing Cyprus. They also have responsibilities for the fact that they left gaps in the defense of the island with the coup. From the conclusion of the Cyprus File, of the Greek Parliament, political responsibilities also arise. Responsibilities for oligarchy and indecision. The Americans did not want a clash between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members. Athens did not use this much in the management that was done.
The members of the Committee on the Cyprus Dossier, of the Greek Parliament, evaluating the testimonies of the protagonists of the meetings held in Athens, in August 1974, came to important conclusions.
A study of the content of these practices reveals the following in relation to the views of the leadership of the Armed Forces.
All four leaders (Bonanos – Galatsanos – Arapakis – Papanikolaou) are bidding to express the view that any sending of substantial (numerically capable) military aid to Cyprus was impossible and beyond that a “lost cause” and in fact could not already affect the situation on the island.
From those mentioned by the military leaders, there are also differences.
Bonanos stated that the defense was impossible with the forces that General Karagiannis had in Cyprus. “It is technically impossible to send aid.
It is possible to send reinforcements to soldiers equipped with light weapons. However, this assistance cannot affect the situation “.
Galatsanos, however, agrees and proposes a specific action plan of the forces that exist in Cyprus.
He says verbatim: “The only possibility of the mortal forces is the submissive movement while maintaining contact.” Galatsanos’ position is quoted exactly as it was formulated, because from the course of events, it was the one that was finally implemented throughout the operations in Cyprus.
It is characteristic, however, that he proceeds to a further assessment and states “until the end of the defense he would probably force the Turks to go beyond their objective purposes”! That is, to turn to Greece. Arapakis had stated that “the Navy has the ability to carry out operations in Cyprus through submarines, as well as the transfer of reinforcements with light weapons.”
For the members of the Committee, the following position of Arapakis is characterized as strange (as it is written in the above minutes): If the word DEFENSE refers to the conclusion, “it is exactly the one used by Arapakis, then it is very strange in every way his position that the defense, which presupposes an attack by the Turks, is in any way a violation of the ceasefire.
If the word defense is wrong, in the written form and instead he used the word “help”, “reinforcement” or a similar expression, then again this position is strange. Because the sending of forces does not necessarily mean a violation of the ceasefire, especially when the Turks have landed on the island with 40.000 army and 150-200 tanks.
We insist on this point because Arapakis is the ONLY military man who expresses a political crisis (diplomatic difficulties in handling). And we think that if combined with the fact that in the critical phase of the ceasefire negotiations, in a strange way, the Americans found Arapakis only from the entire political and military leadership of the junta and negotiated and agreed on the terms of the ceasefire, it raises questions about his attitude “.
In the Commission’s assessment, the role of Arapakis in the Cyprus tragedy in general has not been fully clarified by the information we have in the Commission Files. Papanikolaou agrees with the other leaders about the complete impossibility of providing assistance, but also the impossibility of influencing the situation in case of sending aid.
However, the same leaders of the Armed Forces at the meeting under Mr. K. Karamanlis on August 3, 1974, when asked by the Prime Minister: Why did they not send aid during the invasion (ATTILA I) or on the first day, when the defense was doing well, answered that “The relief mission had been planned and planned for a long time, so it was ready. In view of the risks that the aids would face during the transport of … etc “. According to the conclusion, however, this point of the minutes proves the deception, but also the lie of the then leadership of the Armed Forces and the disorientation of the political leadership.
Because: While on August 3 they claim that the aid mission was planned and “it was ready” (certainly the strength of the troops that would be sent), on 14 August 1974 (after the start of the ATTILA II hostilities) during the meeting at the Ministry of Defense with the participation of Karamanlis – Averof – Ralli, after the order of Karamanlis to form a division in Crete for a mission to Cyprus, the same leaders asked 6-7 days maybe more to form the division, because “the division would be formed by various parts from all over the country and even from Epirus” !!!, as they said. The assurance of the leaders on August 3 that a military force “ready” to help Cyprus was “a blatant lie”.
The military was constantly blocking
The minutes of the meeting between Prime Minister Mr. K. Karamanlis, Minister of National Defense Mr. Evag. Averoff, Minister of the Presidency Mr. G. Ralli and the leaders of the ED (August 14, 1974), is revealing of the situation. The practical statement of Evangelos Averoff to the Committee on the Cyprus Dossier in the Greek Parliament, presents a state of weakness, despair of Greece to face the Turkish advance in Cyprus.
Averoff had been informed by telephone by the Chief of the Armed Forces that a new mass Turkish attack had begun in Cyprus. He was the first to arrive at the Ministry of Defence and had the opportunity to be informed again, pending the rest. “I considered the situation desperate,” he said in a statement to the Commission on the Cyprus Dossier.
Karamanlis had arrived at the Ministry of Defence a little later, accompanied by Minister G. Rallin. The Prime Minister was briefed on paper and in detail by the military leadership. After the briefing, Karamanlis gave the following instructions:
He ordered the three submarines (which had already been ordered to head for Cyprus the day before) to accelerate at their “maximum speed” and to engage in torpedoes of the Turkish ships, warships or merchants, which took part in the invasion”. He also ordered, like a swarm of aircraft, that were in Heraklion, Crete to take off “within the morning to Cyprus, and bomb the most important targets that he would find, preferably ships”.
According to Averoff’s testimony, the leaders “appeared puzzled and expressed general doubts about the expediency and feasibility of the operation.” Karamanlis insisted, Averoff disagreed with the Prime Minister, with whom Rallis agreed.
The discussion showed that neither planes nor submarines could be sent to Cyprus.
Planes would be located and shot down by the Turks while “their stay in the airspace of Cyprus would be between 5 and 10 minutes and due to insufficient fuel and due to enemy fighter jets and anti-aircraft fire. Thus, the possibility of successful aiming was limited.
After dropping their bombs, our aircraft had to either a) be abandoned by the pilots, parachuted, or b) land at the British bases in Cyprus, or c) land in Lebanon, an opera and planned as correct.
This meant the loss of those aircraft that would not be shot down, and this for an indefinite period of time.
“Since the action was likely to lead immediately to a more general Greek-Turkish conflict, the air protection of the mainland and island territory of the country would be reduced to the extent that the aircraft and its pilots would be lost in Crete.”
The ensuing debate without the leaders changed the situation.
After the discussion, the 4 Leaders were summoned again and Karamanlis informed them that the previous plan was abandoned and ordered them to prepare a full division as soon as possible, equipped with tanks, as they transported it to Rodon and Eastern Crete, or where , so that it is ready for fast transport to Cyprus. Ask the soldiers how much time they needed to prepare and they answered 6-7 days!
The next day, while the Turks were advancing in Cyprus, a new meeting was held and these issues were discussed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Mavros. It was agreed as requested by the British to secure the convoy. It was agreed, as it was said, to the British Ambassador, that since England as a guarantor power, and despite its ground bases, “could not restore the constitutional order, Greece, another guarantor power, invoking the same right that Turkey invokes to occupied the island, asked the Great Britain to ensure its transfer and disembarkation of a full division to protect the Greek Cypriots and the Constitutional order “. The request was forwarded to the British ambassador.
On August 17, the British Ambassador received a letter from the British Prime Minister to Karamanlis. The British responded negatively to the Greek request.
The mission of the convoy was characterized as a big mistake. In his testimony, Averoff notes that a conversation he had with the British ambassador revealed that the negative answer had been given after prior consultation with the US Government.
The gathering of the division and its war material was completed on Monday, August 19th.
The responsibilities of managers
In the critical period from 24.7.74 (coup d’etat) until the invasion of ATTILA II (14.8.74), two main politicians handled the issue of sending military aid to Cyprus,
according to the conclusion of the Greek Parliament:
a) The Prime Minister Mr. K. Karamanlis b) The Minister of National Defense Mr. Evangelos Averof. Mr. George Mavros (Minister of Foreign Affairs) had accepted the view that the aid mission was impossible (as assured by the military and the Minister of National Defense).
That is why he states in his letter to our Commission that precisely because there was no possibility of military assistance, all the effort was made at the diplomatic level. The manipulations of G. Mavros were done with the instructions and the consent of the Prime Minister K. Karamanlis. Mr. George Rallis, had participation and influence for decision-making only in the meeting of 14 August 1974 (day of the beginning of ATTILA II). At this meeting, Mr. G. Rallis completely disagreed with Averoff’s views and accepted Karamanlis’ proposals. And when Mr. Karamanlis was convinced by Mr. Averoff’s arguments, he also agreed.
The convoy, Karamanlis, Averoff and the second thoughts
According to Evangelos Averoff, late in the afternoon of August 17, Karamanlis called him. The Greek Prime Minister had told Averoff, according to the latter: His thoughts were that despite the warm support of the International Public Opinion, the various facts of the problem (geographical, foolish project against Makarios, reluctance of the Great to intervene vigorously against Turkey and .ά.) made the handling of the Cyprus problem very difficult and exposed the country.
I wondered whether under these circumstances we should have sent the Division unaccompanied. For her safety, he and I would board the ships, and as soon as the convoy set sail we would announce this internationally, which would prevent the Turks from bombing it.
The President asked me if I accepted and I answered unhesitatingly yes.
He asked me to think about it and to tell him my opinion when the transfer of the Division to Crete is completed.
We discussed the issue again, late in the evening on the 19th. No one else was present. My remarks were as follows:
A. The safety of the convoy would be complete in my opinion. B. The international response would be very favorable. C. But both of us and especially him should return while the division would stay. Air coverage would be impossible, and its supply would depend on the good mood of the Turkish air force. D. Under these circumstances, if the clearly superior Turkish forces in Cyprus attacked the Division, it should be considered certain that after a heroic resistance of several days they would crush it. However, the defeat and crushing of an organized Greek Division would have a completely different meaning from the retreat of the Cypriot National Guard.
The Prime Minister told me that he had made exactly the same analysis. Nevertheless, he said, the possibility should not be ruled out and therefore the Division should remain in Crete, especially since it was so well placed to strengthen the defense of the islands of the southern and central Aegean.
