Will Azerbaycan Recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?
There has been growing speculation that Azerbaycan may be preparing to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). If it does it will only be the second country that officially does so. And critics argue that it would contravene UN Resolutions and pit it against key international actors.
So, will Baku really be able to do it?
By Mustafa Niyazi
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On Cyprus there are two territories with the exact same characteristics of statehood, namely a defined territory, a settled population, government, and the ability to enter into external relations with states, but where one of them is recognised by every state in the world, spare two, one of them is not recognised by every state in the world, spare one.
They are both de facto states, meaning they exist one way or another in fact. Although their de facto status cannot be contested, the conditions surrounding their de jure status, which is the area where we start talking about rightful entitlement or claim, is much less clear.
As a de facto state whose de jure sovereign jurisdiction over the territory it controls is not recognised, and an occupying regime that has been granted de jure sovereign status including over territory it does not control, the TRNC and Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) respectively both exist in a strange place in the international system.
The TRNC exists as an independent country but enjoys limited if any acceptance on the world stage.
The GCASC is widely accepted as the “caretaker government” of the ROC, and has used that to its advantage, to feign legitimacy as the actual ROC, yet is in direct contravention of multiple clauses of the state constitution as well as various international treaties and laws.
As a result the quest for recognition has become the key foreign policy priority for both parties.
The TRNC fulfills every criteria of a state. The Turkish Cypriots have governed themselves for more than 57 years, after a Greek Cypriot coup aimed to displace them and ethnically cleanse the island.
The ROC, occupied illegally by the GCASC, also fulfills every criteria of a state. The Greek Cypriots have also governed themselves for more than 57 years after attacking, illegally occupying and destroying the ROC, before trying to squeeze the Turkish Cypriots out of existence and relevance.
Further symbolisation of the diplomatic constipation of the Turkish side and the virulent successes of the Greek side is that the latter has managed to secure via the European Union (EU) a platform to legally regard the TRNC as a sovereign territory of the GCASC, which is an even more tremendous achievement considering they were accepted into the EU as the ROC, when accepting an occupied or divided state into the EU is in flagrant contravention of EU Laws on the Secession of States as well as Cyprus’ own Constitution and the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance.
For these reasons it is understandable that International Society works within the criteria before them in order to avoid repercussions from other states, in particular the EU bloc, and it is chiefly for these reasons that the world has largely acquiesced to the Greek Cypriot regime and its demands to deny the same trappings of statehood to the Turkish Cypriots.
However, for a variety of reasons I’ll explain, there have been growing concerns over suggestions that Azerbaycan may now be preparing to become the second UN member to recognise the TRNC.
But just how likely is this?
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“Background: Leading to the Current Situation on Cyprus”
Cyprus lies in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In 1571 it became Turkish after 82 years of Venetian rule.
In 1878 the Turks granted suzerainty of Cyprus to Great Britain.
Immediately following Greece began pumping thousands upon thousands of migrant settlers, officers, soldiers, clergymen, teachers and various armed contingents to the island, to beef up the Greek part of the island’s demographics, displace the native Turks through means of ethnic cleansing, attack the British authorities, and achieve enosis, meaning secession to Greece.
In 1914 the British annexed the island and in 1925 declared it a Crown Colony.
In 1950 the Greek Cypriots began an armed separatist terrorism campaign spearheaded by Greece, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the National Organisation of Greek Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). They targeted British servicemen and their families, Turkish Cypriot men, women, children and their elderly, and non-compliant Greek Cypriot men, women and their families. They operated with impunity, suffocating the island in an environment of fear characterised by wanton death and destruction. This included kidnappings, beatings, stabbings, shootings, bombings, mass live burials, burning people alive, mutilations, rape…
In 1955 the British declared the Cyprus Emergency.
In 1955-1956 the Turkish Cypriots formed Volkan, an underground resistance organisation, to counter the EOKA terrorist threat. Several more independent resistance organisations also appeared during this period.
In 1958 the Turkish Cypriots formed the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT), and merged all their resistance organisations together, coordinating their efforts.
Soon thereafter the Turkish Cypriots approached the Greek Cypriots with the proposal to pursue independence from the British together, under the pre-condition of partnership and the immediate ceasure of all terrorist activities, as a means to peacefully resolve the conflict on the island and nullify any further Greek Cypriot ad hominem for violence.
In 1960 Cyprus became independent after 56 years of British colonial rule.
As part of this a complex power sharing agreement was put in place between the island’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.
But it was not on the basis of equality and just three years later the system collapsed, the Greek Cypriots tried to take it all for themselves and exterminate the Turks in the process, and they illegally occupied the government in blatant contravention of the constitution as well as multiple international treaties and laws.
As a result Britain drew the Green Line and separated the island between the two communities, and established a buffer zone for extra measure, to prevent any further conflict caused by Greek Cypriot attacks, and on 13th March 1964, Turkey, also as a legal guarantor power, issued an ultimatum to the Greek Cypriot regime demanding: “All individual or collective assaults and acts committed against the Turkish community in Cyprus such as murder, pillage, robbery, arson, rape, torture and the like to be stopped forthwith…”
The US Sixth Fleet approached Cyprus, Russian submarines converged and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met in an emergency session.
During these sessions the Greek Cypriots lobbied the UN to bring a security detail to the island, believing that such a move would be incapable of intervening as well as create a natural deterrent to any intervention from Turkey, thus providing the platform they needed to continue their ethnic cleansing campaign with impunity.
The UN established a peacekeeping and peacemaking mission on the island, and on the 14th an advance party of the Canadian UNFICYP contingent reached the island, and Turkey backed down, resuming its policy of watchful nonintervention.
The Turkish Cypriots, were up in cheers for being saved by Turkey, and they fervently hoped that the UN would at last re-establish order in Cyprus, but they were to be profoundly disappointed.
The UNFICYP, like the British peacekeeping force before them, could not be everywhere at once, and the Greek Cypriots, as the aggressors, could choose their objectives at will. Moreover, the UNFICYP was powerless. According to its mandate, it could fire only in self defense. Its only deterrent was its presence. As a result, the Greek Cypriots could continue in their efforts to break the back of the Turkish Cypriot resistance.
As the News Bulletin described the situation: “They continued to build up their arms and war equipment by purchasing heavy weapons, ammunition, aircraft and vehicles from abroad… the Turkish communities remained surrounded by the overwhelming Greek forces and were constantly subjected to all kinds of abuse, vexations and pressure. Freedom of movement on the island was totally denied to the Turks; their economic situation continued to deteriorate rapidly, as they were not allowed to sell their produce in the markets, to cultivate their fields, to graze their flocks and to go to their jobs in areas (now) dominated by Greeks. In the villages which the Turks had abandoned in the face of Greek attacks, the houses were put on fire, the properties looted and the harvest confiscated. From March to June the Turkish Cypriots continued to be murdered and the Greeks did not give up their abhorrent method of taking hostages among the innocent people.” – News Bulletin. Issue of February 11, 1977, p.2.
Having been reduced to stateless persons during the 1963-1964 crisis, the Turkish Cypriots had been forced to form their own separate administration, to organise themselves to survive the economic blockade that followed. A patchwork of government had been set up consisting of the Vice-President of the Republic, the three Turkish Cypriot cabinet ministers, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives, the members of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber and a few others. They formed a body known as the General Committee. But when the Greek Cypriots continued their campaign to overrun the Turkish Cypriots they realised that a more efficient administrative machine was required.
On 28 December 1967 a Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (PTCA) (Geçici Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi) was established, with an Executive Committee, Chairman, Legislative Assembly and Supreme Court.
With the formation of the PTCA the separation between the two communities became complete, and in 1968, the first formal UN led talks towards a settlement between the two sides began.
UN led talks continued until in 1974 the military junta in Greece together with EOKA otherthrew the Greek Cypriot government as a prelude to annexing the island.
In response Turkey intervened and put all territory above the Green Line back in the control of the Turkish Cypriots.
They then pushed for a federal settlement.
In 1977 a federal one-state model was proposed by the Turkish Cypriots, supported by Turkey, accepted by the Greek Cypriots and then endorsed by the UNSC.
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“the necessity to continue the talks in a meaningful way that respects both sides”
Despite this a settlement failed to materialise.
The Greek Cypriots were then recognised as the legitimate government of the ROC, a move strongly condemned by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey but still roundly pushed through.
As a result on the 15th November 1983 the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared their independence proclaiming the formation of the TRNC, and citing the necessity to continue the talks in a way that respects both sides.
In a Speech to the UN they stated:
“We are not seceding from the Republic of Cyprus… But if the robbers of my rights (the Greek Cypriots) insist they are the legitimate government of Cyprus, we shall be as legitimate as they, as non-aligned as they, as sovereign as they… and we hope this will be such a weight on the scales for continuing the talks in a meaningful way, that they will come to the negotiating table… by what we have done we have prevented them from running away with OUR sovereignty, with OUR independence, with OUR freedom. They have no right to touch it…” – Rauf Raif Denktaş, Speech to the UN, 15 November 1983
While this was immediately recognised by Turkey it was roundly condemned by the UNSC.
UNSC Resolution 541, 18 November 1983, called the declaration legally invalid and called for its immediate withdrawal. It also called on member states to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and not to recognise any other state on the island.
Six months later this call was reiterated in Resolution 550 and almost 40 years later no other country has since recognised the TRNC.
Meanwhile the search for a federal settlement has continued without success.
In 2004 the UN presented a plan for the reunification of the two communities on Cyprus. The Annan Plan, 31 March 2004. While this was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots despite it being woefully to their disadvantage, it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum.
Then in 2017 another intiative failed following intensive talks between the sides.
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“Azerbaycan may be prepared to recognise the TRNC”
It is to this backdrop that the Turkish Cypriots went to the polls and elected a new President, Ersin Tatar, and his mandate to reject any settlement that does not recognise the two sides as equal sovereign entities with equal rights, arguing that after almost 40 years of failed negotiations the only acceptable option is a two-state solution, a possibility that has also been supported by Turkey.
As part of this, speculation has also been rife that Turkey may be preparing for a big diplomatic push for recognition, in support of the TRNC’s decision.
One of the most closely watched of these possible recognisers is Azerbaycan.
Speculation that Azerbaycan may recognise the TRNC is certainly not new. In fact there’s long been a sense that Azerbaycan is the most likely candidate to recognise the TRNC.
Located in the South Caucuses, Azerbaycan as a brother Turkic state has close cultural ties with the TRNC. As part of the Soviet Union it was unable to recognise the TRNC when it proclaimed independence in 1983. However, following its own independence in 1991, matters changed, as ties between Baku and Lefkoşa have flourished.
Indeed in the period leading up to the Annan Plan voting in 2004, senior Greek Cypriot figures warned that one of the key consequences for rejecting the plan would be Azerbaycan’s recognition of the TRNC.
Of course this still hasn’t happened. And for a long time this was not likely to have happened. For one good reason. Nagorno-Karabakh.
Many will know that Nagorno-Karabak has been covered extensively in the media as of late. But by way of background Nagorno-Karabakh is an Azerbaycan territory which Armenia tried to annex, leading to a war which left 40% of Azerbaijan’s territory under Armenian occupation and control.
Facing this challenge, it was never a realistic prospect that Azerbaijan would recognise the TRNC.
That said, the two states did build up good bilateral relations.
In 2005 Azerbaycan became the second country in the world to accept TRNC passports. In addition Azerbaycan students began attending TRNC universities and there was regular business and cultural cooperation. But for all this, any talk of full recognition stayed impossible.
Until now.
The big change is of course the 44 day war over Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020.
With strong backing from Turkey, Azerbaycan regained control of Armenian occupied areas before Russia managed to broker a ceasefire.
It is all of this, coupled with Turkey’s support for a two-state solution on Cyprus, that is now feeding speculation that Azerbaycan may now be prepared to recognise the TRNC.
For example, Dr Ahmad Shahidov, head of the Azerbaycan Institute for Democracy and Human Rights said the “so-called Nagorno Karabakh Republic no longer exists under the 10 November agreement between Azerbaycan and Armenia… Azerbaycan has liberated its lands from occupation… After the completion of this process, official relations between Azerbaycan and the TRNC can begin…”
But is this really possible?
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“recognising the TRNC would attract real opposition”
During the 44 day war the TRNC pledged its support.
Armenia’s attack on Azerbaycan was also protested at events held in Girne titled “Three flags, one nation”, organised by the President of the Azerbaycan-Cyprus Friendship Society Orhan Hasanoğlu, and attended by Turkish, Azerbaycani and TRNC citizens.
And just last July a parliamentary group from Azerbaycan visited the TRNC to mark the 47th anniversary of their Peace and Freedom Day and expressed Baku’s support, while Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Inter-Parliamentary Relations of the Milli Majlis in Azerbaycan, Samad Seyidov, affirmed Azerbaycan’s desire for the TRNC “to be strong”.
These are all positive signs which reaffirm the friendly ties between both states.
But is this enough to mean Baku would want to officially recognise the TRNC and establish full diplomatic relations?
Of course many observers suspect that Ankara may also be leaning on Baku to do it as a sign of gratitude for Turkish help in the war. But it’s not clear if this is actually the case. In fact, contrary to this contemporary obsession with strenuously trying to paint Ankara as an imposing bully, and given Turkey’s actual record of a preference towards watchful non-intervention, this is most likely not to be true.
Even if it is, there are those who would argue there might be good reasons as to why Baku might want to hold off on recognition.
Most obviously, having spent many years calling for the defense of its territorial integrity, the Greek Cypriots would argue it would be hypocritical if one of Baku’s first moves after regaining control over much of its land was to undermine the territorial integrity of another country.
While Baku may argue that its case is different from Cyprus, some would argue that in truth the parallels are striking.
Moreover it’s also worth noting that while Azerbaycan clearly won the war, Nagorno-Karabakh still hasn’t been resolved. Russian peacekeepers may have put things on hold and agreements may have been signed dissolving the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, but a final settlement deal will still need to materialise at some point.
Is it advisable to alienate important parts of the international community and deliberately go against UNSC Resolutions when Baku may need the support of the UNSC and Resolutions of its own in the future?
Although these are strong arguments there’s nevertheless a sense that Baku may still be tempted to go ahead and do it.
Indeed there are actually many legal grounds to support recognising the TRNC, or even more boldly, no longer recognising the GCASC.
One could even argue that such bold steps would actually underscore that Azerbaycan no longer regards Nagorno-Karabakh as a separatist threat, and further enforce the notion that it opposes the occupation of any country’s territory, or in this case, the GCASC’s occupation of the ROC government and it’s obsession with extending that to the TRNC, over which it has no actual jurisdiction or right for that matter.
Many could also argue that it would be much more logical to recognise Kosovo which Turkey has also championed and which Azerbaycan has previously held off recognising due to Nagorno-Karabakh. Unlike recognising the TRNC which would attract real opposition, this will likely be recognised by many key western countries.
But lets say it still goes ahead and recognises the TRNC. What happens then?
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“any decision by Azerbaycan on recognition is solely up to Baku and nobody has the right or ability to contest it”
“First and foremost it’s important to emphasise that recognition is a sovereign prerogative of states. Indeed it’s a fundamental element of statehood. And while there’s a general expectation that countries will follow a set of legal principles when taking such a decision, there’s no way to compel a state to adopt a certain set of internationally agreed criteria when doing so.” – James Ker-Lindsay, Will Azerbaijan recognise Northern Cyprus, 26 December 2020
In other words any state has the sovereign right to recognise any territory it sees fit as a state if it wishes.
In this regard any decision by Azerbaycan on recognition is solely up to Baku and nobody has the right or ability to contest it. This also means it cannot be reversed by an outside body. But of course Baku would come under enormous pressure to change its mind.
The most obvious and symbolically powerful way to do this would be through a UNSC Resolution condemning the move.
But while this may have enormous political weight its un-enforcable.
The UNSC could ask Baku to rethink its position, however it couldn’t declare Baku’s decision to be null and void. After all, if this was possible, the UNSC would have done this to Turkey in 1983.
Still the political weight is not to be dismissed lightly. A resolution condemning its recognition and reaffirming earlier resolutions would actually serve as a powerful reminder that the earlier resolutions are in fact still in force.
But there are ways to challenge these resolutions.
Another route would be for Baku to bring a case against the GCASC (not the ROC, but the GCASC) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the grounds that the Greek Cypriots had violated their obligation under the UN Charter to respect Cyprus’ and the TRNC’s territorial integrity.
Given that the Greek Cypriots would refuse to join any further matters of the court, Azerbaycan would probably have to secure a general assembly resolution seeking advisory opinion from the court. But even if the court did agree that the GCASC violated the requirement to respect Cyprus’ or the TRNC’s territorial integrity and finding one would almost certainly expect given UNSC resolutions in place on the matter, the opinion would not be binding. Even another resolution from the General Assembly requesting the GCASC to comply with the court’s opinion would carry little weight if the Greek Cypriots simply continued occupying the state.
But there is one factor that could make this difficult.
Perhaps the biggest problem is not the UN, but the European Union (EU).
When Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004 they officially did so as a single undivided state. The TRNC is legally regarded by the EU as a sovereign territory of a member state.
If Baku were to recognise it as independent it would inevitably lead to retaliatory measures from the EU.
Some would ask whether the EU would like to take such strong measures especially given the important energy relationship between Azerbaycan and the EU. In reality the members would have no choice but to act. Even if the other members didn’t want to take a tough stance the Greek Cypriots would almost certainly stand in the way of every possible decision it could until the other members fell into line over such a fundamentally important issue.
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no repercussions going straight for full recognition
The recent election of a new President committed to a two-state solution combined with Azerbaycan’s victory over Armenia has led to raised speculation that Baku may now honour Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
While there’s certainly excitement at the thought and doing so would send a strong moral message to the EU and UN, will Baku really do it?
Having spent years defending its own sovereignty on the world stage, it has a very strong moral position, and would be doing a favour to a very close ally. And while there’s little if anything that could be done if a move to recognise the TRNC went ahead, let alone reverse it, it would still almost certainly have serious repercussions on Azerbaycan in terms of its relationship with the EU.
However, what this ultimately boils down to is this:
The ROC that is currently recognised by the UN and the EU bloc is the ROC as established by the 1960 Treaties. The GCASC itself is not recognised. Therefore, Baku would not be overstepping by simply following this prerogative and recognising that very same ROC government, but also recognising it is divided, recognising that currently it does not constitutionally exist, recognising that it is occupied illegally by the GCASC, and opposing that regime, which like it or not, is in flagrant contravention of Cyprus’ own Constitution and the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance, and its being a member of the EU is also illegal by the same Internationally binding Treaties and laws, as well as the EU’s own Laws on the Secession of States…
It is for these reasons, as well as the hypocrisies and double standards of the EU that there is no moral ground to condemn a move from Baku to recognise the TRNC.
Comparitively, it is the very international treaties and laws, UN Resolutions and laws of the EU and Cyprus that Baku can use to recognise the TRNC and defeat any opposition to that.
For all these reasons, there’s a strong argument to be made that Azerbaycan will most certainly continue to upgrade its ties to the TRNC and if done correctly would see no real repercussions going straight for full recognition.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of CypriumNews.
