“The Alliance Treaty could be structured as a new Treaty, but it should include provision for the permanent presence of Turkish troops. Zero troops were a red line for Turkey.”
The above phrase is included in the official minutes of the United Nations of the meeting of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu.
The meeting of the two men took place on July 6, 2017, at 1 p.m. (local time) in the resort of Crane Montana, Switzerland. In other words, the meeting took place before the famous dinner, which was blown up by the occupying power, which, however, was able – with the help of the UN’s own people and famous Greek Cypriots – to blame the collapse of the talks in Nicosia.
In the official minutes, signed by Mathias Souster, it is also noted that:
“Mr. Çavusoglu stated that for Turkey the view of zero troops, zero guarantees was not a starting position (was a non-starter)”.
The Turkish Minister was answering Mr Guterres’ basic question, which – according to the minutes – was as follows:
What are Turkey’s red lines in view of the talks of the past few days? This is the question he asked Mr Tsavousoglou as soon as the meeting began.
Mr. Guterres also received from the Turkish minister an informal document with the exact Turkish positions. He even asked him to keep it confidential and apparently not to share it with Nicos Anastasiades and Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias, probably not even with the representative of the European Commission.
Therefore, the Secretary-General knew many hours before dinner Ankara’s exact positions on security and guarantees. The positions were negative. On the issue of troops, Turkey’s views would be made known at a second meeting, on the same day, which took place at 6 p.m. (We will present a relevant document in a new text).
Before departing from the first meeting, Mr. Guterres sought to receive a “positive” response from Mr. Çavusoglu, on the unilateral right to intervene, so that he could go to the dinner with a strong position of Turkey.
The minutes shall state the following:
The Secretary-General asked whether this meant that Turkey could accept an immediate replacement of the Guarantee Treaty with the Implementing Treaty and abolish the unilateral right to intervene.
What did Mr Çavusoglu say? This was not the case.
Mr Guterres, according to our information, was seeking the immediate abolition of Turkey’s guarantees and interventionist rights and wanted to take advantage of the confidential informal document given to him by the Turks and containing their red lines.
However, instead of confirming it, it took a vertical refusal, which it seems – and we repeat – that it hid from Mr Anastasiades, Mr Kotzias and also from the representatives of the European Union. Apparently he only informed the British.
A diplomatic source from whom we asked for an analysis of the specific minutes of the conversation between Mr. Guterres and Mevlut Çavuşoğlu replied with a question:
Because the Secretary General, during the discussion with the Turkish Minister, did not reply that Mr. Anastasiades, 12 hours before, submitted written proposals, when Mr. Çavusoglu insisted that no progress had been made on table 2 and that any Turkish “concessions” on security issues must precede the concessions from Nicosia and Athens on so-called internal issues (governance, property, equal treatment of Greek and Turkish citizens;
We note that Mr. Anastasiades, had submitted in writing proposals on the framework of the Secretary-General. The proposals were characterized as unacceptable concessions – and they were unacceptable – and concerned the issues of the internal aspect (table 2), the rotating presidency, the equal treatment of all citizens.
“The Treaty of Guarantee is a taboo subject for Turks and Turkish Cypriots”
The whole document follows:
Notes from the meeting of the Secretary General with THE SA Mrs. Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, Crans Montana, Switzerland, 6 July 2017, 1 p.m.
Present:
The Secretary-General, Mr. Çavusoglu Mr. Eide, Mr. Ouzügergin, Mrs. Spehar, Mr. Gün, Mrs. Hett, Mr. Bastcieri, Mrs. Richardson, Mrs. Warnn-Schmith, Mr. Süster, Minutes
Main points erected:
•The Secretary General and Mr. Çavuşoğlu exchanged views on the issues under negotiation in the chapter on security and guarantees. Mr Çavuşoğlu presented confidential information on a feasible way forward on this issue.
Follow-up actions: None
Summary of the discussion:
1.The Secretary-General asked what Turkey’s red lines were, taking into account the talks of the previous days.
2. Mr. Çavusoglu stated that for Turkey the view of zero troops, zero guarantees was not a starting position (was a non-starter). Since they had any hope of reaching an agreement, Turkey has shown some flexibility. He could now see some improvements in the talks that he had not seen before, particularly on the part of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. He could have shown more flexibility, but he could not do so for two reasons: Greek Cypriots were leaking information to the media, including the Turkish proposal that was served earlier in the week. In addition, there were no developments in the intercommunal dialogue at table 2.
3. As an additional constructive contribution, Turkey could provide an informal document (non-paper). This contained very sensitive elements, some of which corresponded to Mr Eyden’s terminology. There, too, some additional steps could be taken that were not presented in the document. Mr. Eyte noted that the sensitivity is understandable.
4. Mr. Çavuşoğlu stated that the Treaty of Guarantee is a taboo subject between the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots had vital security concerns. That is why it has been extremely difficult for Turkey to change its position on this matter. Nevertheless, he had shown flexibility. Turkey has been showing positive attitude towards a solution to the Cyprus problem for a long time. In relation to the non-paper he believed that the United Nations would keep it confidential. Any leak would destroy everything.
5. What Turkey could accept is the RENAMING of the Treaty of Guarantee to the Implementing Treaty. With four parties. At the initial stage the Treaty WOULD INCLUDE the right to unilateral action if joint action by all parties (to deal with acts of concern) would not be possible.
If the political and economic aspects of the solution were to prove successful, there could be a review at a commonly accepted date.
The Turkish Cypriots suggested that for them this could happen after three elections for the presidency and the parliament. However, if the solution were successfully implemented, the review could be done earlier.
6. With regard to the reduction of troops, a significant reduction of troops could be made with the start of the implementation of the solution. There could still be further reductions, there could be a review depending on the progress of the implementation of the solution. An effective implementation would further accelerate the withdrawal.
7. The Alliance Treaty could be structured as a new Treaty, but should include provision for the permanent presence of Turkish troops. Zero troops were a red line for Turkey. The Treaty can be renamed the Treaty of Friendship, in accordance with the proposal made by Mr. Kotzias.
8. It noted that what the non-paper offers will only apply if a solution is reached on all aspects, and in particular to the satisfaction of the Turkish Cypriot side on the following aspects:
– Political equality (including rotating presidency and effective participation) .
– Equal treatment of Greek and Turkish nationals on the island (workers, persons, capital).
– Pending issues in the capital of the property, to ensure the clear majority ownership of the Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot component state. Any agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be enough for Turkey. But there are other issues, including the one on the final agreement on federal powers and legal certainty under EU law. This should be achieved by making the necessary changes in primary law. He knew this was not easy, but the EU and Turkish Cypriot experts are meeting at this hour on the issue. There should be no chance of the solution being challenged in European Courts.
9. In relation to the unilateral right to intervene, they first needed to see that a solution had been reached in all aspects, including the territorial aspect. Monitoring the implementation of the solution is also crucial. There should be a mechanism here that gives the necessary collateral to the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, a certain number of Turkish troops should remain. In such circumstances they may be able to think of showing more flexibility in relation to the right to intervene. However, they should first see that the Cypriots agreed on all the chapters. This is not just an issue for both sides. As guarantor powers they had specific responsibilities.
10. The Secretary-General asked whether this meant that Turkey could accept an immediate replacement of the Guarantee Treaty with the Implementing Treaty and abolish the unilateral right to intervene.
11. Mr. Çavuşoğlu stated that this was not the case.
But if all issues were resolved as he described, he could speak to Ankara to ensure more flexibility. He meant what he said in relation to that. For now, this should remain confidential.
Matthias Schuster (Mathias Sousster)
OSASG
